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INTRODUCTiONTheoreticalattempts to explain participation in illegitimate activi-
ties often have been guided by the preconception that since crime
is deviant behavior, its causes must be sought in deviant factors
and circumstances determing behavior. Criminal behavior has
traditionally been linked to an offender's allegedly unique motiva-
tion, which in turn has been ascribed to a unique "inner structure"
(e.g., deviations from physiological and mental health, spiritual
degeneration), to the impact of exceptional social or family circum-
stances (e.g., political and social anomalies, war conditions, the
disruption of family life), or to both. The relation between educa-
tion and crime has also been generally treated within this frame-
work, for the issues raised have frequently centered upon the role
'of education in determining or affecting the motivation and pro-
pensities of juvenile delinquents.'
A reliance on a motivation unique to the offender as the major
explanation of crime does not, in general, lead to the formulation
of predictions regarding the outcome of objective circumstances.
I also am unaware of any persuasive empirical evidence in support
of a systematic relation between crime and traditional sociological
variables.2 An alternative and not necessarily incompatible point
NOTE:This paper, a derivative of my doctoral dissertation, was completed
in May 1971. Financial support for this work was granted by the Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education. I am grateful to E. Moskowitz and Randall
Mark for valuable editorial comments.
'For an overview of the significance of education and the school in the area of
juvenile delinquency, see Eichorn (1965).
2For example, Cohen (1964) reports low correlation between homicide rates
and such social phenomena as illiteracy, industrialization, farm tenancy, den-
sity of rural population, and church membership.
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ofreference is that even if those who violate specific laws differ
significantly in various respects from those who abide by the same
laws, the former, not unlike the latter, do respond to incentives:
costs and gains available to them in legitimate and illegitimate
pursuits. Rather than resort to hypotheses concerning unique per-
sonal characteristics and social conditions affecting "respect for
the law," penchant for violence, preference for risk, or, in general,
preferences for crime, one may distinguish preferences from objec-
tive opportunities and examine the extent to which illegal behavior
can be explained by the effect of opportunities, given preferences.
This approach, due largely to initial efforts by Fleisher (1966) and
Smigel-Leibowitz (1965) and a significant contribution by Becker
(1968), has been used in my work on crime (Ehrlich, 1970, 1973)
to develop an economic model of participation in illegitimate ac-
tivities. The model emphasizes behavioral implications that may
be tested against available empirical evidence. It has been applied
to, and found largely consistent with, data on crime variations
across states and over time in the United States.
This chapter discusses the possible effects of education upon
various opportunities available to offenders. Because data required
for systematic study of these effects are insufficient, this chapter
emphasizes analytical issues. I start with a general exposition of
the model of participation in illegitimate activities and derive a
few propositions concerning the relation between education and
crime. I then examine some empirical evidence bearing upon this
relation from arrest, prison, and crime statistics.
THEInspite of the diversity of activities defined as illegal, all such ac-
tivities share some common properties. Any violation of the law
may be thought of as potentially raising the offender's money or
property income, the money equivalent of his psychic income, or
both. In committing a violation, one also risks a reduction in
income, however, for conviction entails "paying" a penalty, acquir-
ing a criminal record, and other disadvantages. As an alternative
to violating the law, a person may behave legally and earn an al-
ternative legal income, which may also be subject to risks. In gen-
eral, therefore, the net gain in both activities is subject to uncer-
tainty.
A simple model of choice between legal and illegal activities
can be formulated within the framework of the usual economicOn the relation between education and crime315
theoryof behavior under uncertainty. A central hypothesis of this
theory is that if the two activities were mutually exclusive, one
would choose to commit the violation (income prospect I), to take
an alternative legitimate action (income prospect L), or to be in-
different between the two as his expected utility from the violation
exceeded, fell short of, or was equal to that from the legal alterna-
tive—or, in symbols:
U*(I) (L) (12-1)
where U* denotes an expected utility operator.3
The "gain" associated with illegitimate behavior is a function
of gross returns and various costs. The term gross returns denotes
the value of the "output" of an offender's activity, the direct mone-
tary and psychic income he reaps from accomplishing offenses
of a specific crime category i. Particularly in the case of crimes
involving material gains, gross returns are a function of the offen-
der's skill and ability to commit offenses e1 and the level of various
inputs K1, including his own time, accomplices' services, tools,
means of transportation, and other resources used for gathering
information, planning and committing offenses, and disposing of
stolen goods. In addition, payoffs on most crimes against property
and on some crimes against the person depend in large measure
on the amount of transferable assets and other human and non-
human wealth available to potential victims of crime A, as well
as on the latter's expenditure and efficiency at "self-protection"
against victimization cj. Thus, in general, illegitimate income Y, can
be thought of as a function of the productivity of both the offender
and others:
=f,(K1,e1,A1;c1) (12-2)
For analytical convenience, this income is defined net of direct
3 thatby this hypothesis crime always "pays" if the variety of monetary
and psychic costs and returns that offenders derive from crime, including their
"pleasure" from risk, are taken into account. If an offender is free to choose,
and always acts to maximize his utility given his opportunities, then his actual
engagement in crime indicates that utility is thus maximized. Such a "positive"
approach constitutes perhaps the main difference between this analysis and
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costsof purchased inputs, since those costs could be deducted with
certainty from the gross returns.4
The monetary and psychic costs associated with illegitimate
behavior generally include both immediate and delayed cost ele-
ments. Again for analytical convenience, the opportunity costs of
the offender's time, which are represented by his returns from
the alternative (legitimate) activity, are excluded. Only the costs
incurred by the perpetrator if he is apprehended and convicted of
the crime (including the prospect of losing the loot) are considered.
One such cost element is the penalty that society imposes on con-
victed offenders in the form of a monetary fine, a prison term, pro-
bation, or a combination of these. Unlike a monetary fine, which
is a unique quantity, the cost incurred in the case of, say, imprison-
ment is indirect and specific to the individual. It can be measured
as the properly discounted value of his opportunity costs of time
spent in prison and his psychic cost of detention, net of any benefits
obtained during the period of incarceration. An additional cost
possibly incurred by the offender if he is imprisoned, probationed,
or even just arrested is a reduction in his future stream of income
in legitimate activities as a result of the effect of a "criminal record"
on job opportunities (including legal restrictions). This effect would
leave a person with less freedom in choosing an optimum occupa-
tional mix throughout his working career. The discounted value
in terms of income at time t of the future costs of fines, imprison-
ment, and other possible losses is denoted by F,.
Since only apprehended and convicted offenders are subject to
the loss of F, the final gain is uncertain. If the offender is assumed
to have a subjective probability of being caught and punished
4Privateself-protection against crime via watchdogs, guards, locks, and other
safety devices increases the offender's direct costs of achieving any given gross
payoff and reduces the probability that the crime can be carried out success-
fully. In addition, private self-insurance through the maintenance of valuables
in safe-deposit boxes, the marking of personal property to reduce its market-
ability in stolen-goods markets, and refraining from specific consumption ac-
tivities reduces the potential loss to the victim and the gain to the offender in
case a crime is committed. Private defense against crime thus generates a prob-
ability distribution of net outcomes from crime rather than a sure return. Of
course, even if the extent of private self-protection against crime were fully
known, the gross return from criminal activity would still be subject to random
variations. However, Y1 is treated here as having a unique magnitude in order
to emphasize analytically the uncertainty associated with punishment and other
potential costs of apprehension and conviction.On the relation between education and crime317
thenaccording to the usual economic analysis, his expected utility
from engaging in illegitimate activity is
(I) =(1—p1)U(W+ ,Y1) + p1U(W+ Y1 —F,)(12-3)
where W denotes income from other sources which, for simplicity,
is assumed to be known with certainty.5
The alternative legal gain that an individual can achieve by al-
locating his time and other purchased inputs to a legitimate activity
1 rathef than to i is denoted byGenerally speaking, a legitimate
activity can be regarded as safer than an illegitimate one since the
latter includes the prospect of apprehension and punishment in
addition to many conventional occupational hazards. Also, losses
in legitimate activity may be partly offset by market insurance,
whereas no such insurance is provided against punishment for
crime. However, there is no full insurance against, say, unemploy-
ment —ahazard which is presumably more characteristic of legiti-
mate activity—and legitimate returns in such a case may be reduced
to —D,where D> 0. Given a probability of unemployment
ofEq.(12-1) can now be specified as
(1 —p1)U(W+ Y,) +pU(W+
(12-4)
><￿(l_/1)U(W+ Y1)+p..U(W+ Y,—D)
Equation (12-4) identifies the basic set of opportunities affecting
the decision to participate in illegitimate activities: an individual's
legitimate and illegitimate earning opportunities, the probability
and severity of punishment, and the probability of (and losses from)
unemployment in legitimate activity.
The preceding analysis of the offender's choice assumes that
legal and illegal behavior are mutually exclusive. The decision to
engage in illegal activity is not inherently an either/or choice, how-
ever, and in practice, offenders may combine a number of legitimate
5The expected utility in Eq. (12-3) is derived for simplicity on the basis of two
contingencies only: getting away with the crime and being apprehended and
punished. In practice, the criminal prospect includes more contingencies, de-
pending upon the form and extent of the punishment imposed and the reward
obtained. However, the analysis can easily be generalized to cover any finite
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andillegitimate activities or switch occasionally from one to another
during any given period throughout their lifetime. In addition,
neither the probability of being apprehended and convicted nor
the punishment if convicted is determined by society's actions
alone, but may be modified by deliberate actions of offenders. For
example, an offender can reduce his chances of being caught or of
being charged with a crime by spending resources on covering his
illegal activity, "fixing" policemen and witnesses, employing legal
counsel, or, in general, by providing "self-protection." The relevant
object of choice to an offender might be defined more appropriately
as an optimum occupational mix: the optimum allocation of his
time and other resources to competing legal and illegal activities.
An attempt to attack this more comprehensive decision problem
via a one-period uncertainty model is formally presented in my
studies of participation in illegitimate activities (Ehrlich, 1970,
1973), which contain detailed analyses and discussion of the issue.
One result derived from that model is that the same set of variables
identified in Eq. (12-4) as underlying an offender's decision to
enter an illegitimate activity i, when defined in terms of marginal
rather than total quantities, also determines the extent of participa-
tion in 1. In particular, if earnings in both i and 1 are not subject
to strong time dependencies such as those resulting from specific
training or learning by doing, many offenders —especiallythose
who are risk avoiders —havean incentive to participate in both
activities, partly as self-insurance against the relatively greater
risk involved in the full-time pursuit of a risky activity. In that
case, entry into i, and the extent of participation in a given period,
would be related positively to the absolute difference between cur-
rent "wage rates" in i and 1, w —and generally also to the
probability of unemployment in 1. They would be negatively related
to both the probability of apprehension and punishment for crime
p and the discounted value of the penalty per offense f.Theanal-
ysis also implies that the greater the extent of participation in i
and the greater the efficiency of self-protection, the greater the
offender's incentive to provide such protection, and vice versa.
"Professional" offenders are therefore likely to be underrepresented
in arrest statistics, and the converse is true for occasional and less-
skilled offenders (see Ehrlich, 1970, pp. 114—119). More impor-
tantly, the analysis shows why many offenders tend to repeat their
crimes even after being apprehended and punished for previousOn the relation between education and crime319
offenses.Even if there were no systematic variations in preferences
for crime and attitudes toward risk from one period to another
(these may, in fact, intensify), an offender is likely to make the
same choice of an optimum participation in crime if the opportuni-
ties available to him remain unchanged. Indeed, it is plausible to
assume that legitimate opportunities become much poorer relative
to illegitimate opportunities in periods following conviction for
crime because of the effect of having a criminal record on legitimate
employment opportunities. Recidivism is thus not necessarily
the result of an offender's myopia, erratic behavior, or lack of self-
control, but rather may be the result of choice dictated by oppor-
tunities.
EDUCATIONIseducation likely to have a systematic effect on the incentive to
ANDCRIMEparticipatein illegitimate activity?6 If the main effect of education
on occupational choices were through its role in directing the in-
dividual's motivation and propensities toward socially acceptable
goals, one might expect to find a negative correlation across persons
between education and all criminal activities. The model suggests
that the relation between education and crime may be more intri-
cate, however, since it depends in large measure on the way educa-
tion affects the relative opportunities available to offenders in dif-
ferent illegitimate activities. Broadly speaking, "education" —by
which here is meant schooling, legitimate training, and other indi-
cators of human capital7 —canbe regarded as an efficiency param-
eter in the production of legitimate as well as illegitimate market
and nonmarket returns. In addition, education may increase an
offender's productivity atself-protection against apprehension
and punishment for crime, as well as against various legitimate
occupational hazards. Since education generally enhances the
pecuniary part of both legitimate and illegitimate "wages," and thus
6Another interesting source of interaction between education and crime is the
possible effect a person's education may have on the likelihood that he will
become a victim rather than a perpetrator of crime, as a result of the systematic
relation between education and efficiency at sell-protection. The theoretical
arguments and specific behavioral implications have been developed by Ehrlich
and Becker (1972). Neil Komesai of the University of Chicago, has been
investigating this relation empirically in his doctoral research.
empirical measures of education are all wedded to legitimate activities
and are not likely to reflect training specific to illegitimate activities.Education, income, and human behavior320
thepecuniary opportunity cost of imprisonment and other losses,8
and may reduce the probability of many hazards, its overall effect
on participation in crime cannot be determined a priori and would
depend on the extent of its relative effect on the productivities of
inputs used to produce legitimate and illegitimate returns and to
reduce the relevant risks.
Consider the following cases for illustration. If education were
completely general in the sense that it enhanced by the same propor-
tion legitimate and illegitimate wages, the discounted value of
punishment per offense, and the marginal productivity of time
spent in nonmarket activities without affecting the probability of
unemployment or the probability of apprehension and punishment
for crime or the relative preference for illegal activities,9 then the
individual's optimum allocation of time to competing activities
would not necessarily be affected (see Ehrlich, 1970, p. 30). Higher
education in this case would not deter participation in illegitimate
activity. In contrast, if education were completely specific to, say,
legitimate activity in the sense that it enhanced the legitimate wage
to1 and the discounted value of the opportunity cost of imprison-
ment and other losses per offense f without affecting the opportu-
nities available in illegitimate activity, then it would be likely
to reduce the incentive to participate in crime. Moreover, since
specific training introduces time dependencies because of its effect
on future earnings, persons with such training have an incentive
to specialize in one legitimate occupation at least as long as a large
fraction of their working time is devoted to on-the-job training.
Although no single pair of alternative legitimate and illegitimate
activities may provide a perfect empirical counterpart for these
extreme cases, the classification of illegal activities according to
the degree of their complementarity with empirical measures of
education may be analytically useful.
Suppose that pecuniary payoffs on index crimes against property
8Future losses resulting from a criminal record may be particularly harmful
for individuals who have specific legitimate training and whose earnings are
disproportionately high in specific legitimate occupations. The discounted value
of the opportunity cost of imprisonment may also be disproportionately large
for more educated people if their rate of borrowing against future earnings is
relatively low.
9Alternatively, it may be assumed that both probabilities decline with education,
but the relative reductions do not affect the incentive to participate in either
i or 1.On the relation between education and crime321
(robbery,burglary, larceny, and auto theft) were largely dependent
on the level of transferable assets in the community—i.e., opportu-
nities provided by potential victims of crime —andto a much lesser
extent on education and training. Also assume that the relative
preferences for legitimate and illegitimate activities were either
proportionately related to or largely independent of the relative
pecuniary returns from these activities. Several propositions con-
cerning offenders' characteristics would follow in this case. Given
the probability of apprehension and punishment and the length
of time served in prison:
Those with a lower level of schooling and training, i.e., those with
potential legal income well below the average, would have a rela-
tively large wage differential in crimes against property and a rela-
tively low opportunity cost of imprisonment and thus a relatively
strong incentive to "enter" crimes against property. Moreover,
according to this theory, they would also tend to spend more time
at, or to "specialize" in, illegitimate activities relative to other of-
fenders. In contrast, those with higher education —in particular,
those with specific legitimate training—would have less incentive
to participate in such crimes. 10
2Offenders committing crimes against property would tend to enter
criminal activity at a relatively young age, essentially because lack
of schooling and legitimate training are not important obstacles
to such activities and because legitimate earnings opportunities
available to young age groups may generally fall short of their po-
tential illegitimate payoffs. Moreover, since entry of the very young
into the legitimate labor force is restricted by child labor laws,
compulsory schooling, and federal minimum wage provisions, their
entry into criminal activity may frequently precede entry into legiti-
mate activity.
tOA lower level of education that generally results in lower legitimate earnings
may also be related positively to index crimes against the person (murder, rape,
and assault), although the relation here is less clear than in the case of crimes
against property. On the one hand, a lower opportunity cost of time reduces
the cost of engaging in time-intensive activities, and these crimes may well fit
into this category because of the prospect of long imprisonment terms associ-
ated with them. On the other hand, little can be said about the interaction be-
tween education and malevolence or other interpersonal frictions leading to
crimes against the person. Empirical evidence shows that crimes against the
person prevail among groups known to exercise close and frequent social con-
tact (see Ehrlich, 1970, pp. 8—11).Education, income, and human behavior322
3Those in school would have less incentive to participate in crime
relative to those not enrolled since many of them specialize volun-
tarily in acquiring education and therefore would view their oppor-
tunity cost of time not in terms of their potential current earnings
but in relation to the expected future returns on their investment
in human capital. In addition, effective school attendance (enroll-
ment net of truancy) poses a constraint on students' participation
in crime because it leaves them with less time for the pursuit of
all market activities —legitimate as well as illegitimate. Proposition
2 therefore applies, in particular, to youths not enrolled in school.
In contrast to index crimes against property, payoffs on crimes
such as fraud, forgery, embezzlement, trade in illegal merchandise,
and illegal commercial practices may depend on education and
legitimate training in much the same way that legitimate earnings
do.1' Consequently:
4Theaverage educational attainment of offenders engaged in this
class of crimes can be expected to be higher than that of offenders
engaged in property crimes.
5The typical age of entry into such crimes would be higher because
entry would follow a longer period of specialization in schooling.
In fact, because more highly skilled occupations may involve inten-
sive on-the-job training during the initial period of the working
career, entry into related illegitimate activities may occur later
than entry into the labor market.
6 A general implication of this analysis concerns the educational
attainments of offenders belonging to different racial groups. To
the extent that occupational and wage discrimination against non-
white workers is greater in legitimate than in illegitimate activities,
the critical pecuniary wage differential —w,)*,which is the
amount sufficient to induce all workers of equal preferences to
enter an illegitimate activity 1, would be associated with relatively
high educational attainment of the worker in the case of nonwhites.
Consequently, one may expect the average educational attainments
of nonwhite offenders to exceed those of whites in many illegiti-
mate activities.
"This dependence may be due partly to the fact that engaging in specific legiti-
mate activities is a prerequisite for the commission of specific offenses, for
















In spite of the general interest in the relation between education
and crime, very little detailed evidence on educational attainments
of offenders by type of crime has been reported systematically in
official crime statistics. Some direct information on the educational
attainment of all prisoners in the United States is available on an
aggregate level, cross-classified by age and sex.
A generally recognized problem with arrest and prison data is
that they relate to offenders who have been apprehended and con-
victed of crime and who do not make up a representative sample
of all offenders. The via this selective sampling
may be particularly severe where educational attainments of offend-
ers are concerned, for education is likely to be negatively related
to the probability of apprehension and conviction. Arrest and prison
data are thus likely to understate the average educational attain-
ments of all offenders. Nevertheless, some inferences might still
be drawn from these data concerning the comparative educational
attainment of offenders involved in different crimes, since the
biases inherent in the data may apply uniformly to all crime cate-
gories. Another problem with the aggregate arrest and prison data
is that, at best, they render possible inferences about only the sim-
ple (zero-order) correlation between measures of education and
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75 and older 6.4 n.a.* 7.2
8.5 6.4 8.0
8.5 6.6 7.9
* na.not avada bin.
SOURCES:1960 Census ofthe Population—Final Report PC(2)—8A (Table 25),
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963a; and 1960 Census of the Population—Final Report PC(2)
—5B (Table 8); U.S. Bureau of the Census, l963b.Education, income, and human behavior324
relation between these variables given the probability and severity
of punishment.
Table 12-1 compares Bureau of the Census data on the median
school years completed by all offenders in state, federal, and local
jails and workhouses with schooling of all males in the civilian
labor force and in two specific legitimate occupations. On the
whole, male prisoners in all correctional institutions appear to
have had less schooling than all male workers in the experienced
civilian labor force, and the same holds for females (U.S. Bureau
of the Census, 1963a, Table 25; 1963b, Table 8). The reported age-
specific schooling attainments become more similar, however,
when male prisoners are compared with male laborers (except
mine and farm workers) and with operatives and kindred workers
—twooccupations most frequently stated to be the prisoners' major
legitimate occupations (see Table 12-2). Federal prisoners appear
Never worked (percentage)
Worked in 1950 or later (percentage)
Last major occupation (percentage of
those who worked in 1950 or later)
Professional, technical, and
kindred workers
Farmers and farm managers
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tobe better schooled than state prisoners in all specific age groups,
and this systematic difference may reflect the involvement of federal
prisoners in a somewhat different set of offenses —more illegal
commercial activities and fewer crimes against the person —from
those in which state prisoners are involved.12 The age-specific
schooling attainments of prisoners in local jails and workhouses
also appear higher than those of state prisoners, but since the cen-
sus does not report the distributionof these prisoners by type of
crime committed, it is difficult to draw inferences from this evi-
dence alone. It is interesting to note that the median schooling
attainments across these three correctional institutions are nega-
tively correlated with the apparent degree of offender "specializa-
tion" in illegitimate activity: offenders in local jails and workhouses,
who are "best schooled" among prisoners of all age groups, include
the lowest proportion of those who never worked and thehighest
proportion of those who worked in 1950 or later (see Table 12-2).
Since offenders convicted for crimes against property constitute
the majority of offenders in all correctional institutions, this finding
is consistent with the theoretical expectation that for this set of
crimes, both the incentive to enter illegal activity and the extent
of participation (specialization) should be negatively correlated
with schooling and legitimate training.
A comparison of the age distribution of males in two legitimate
occupations and in city arrests for various felonies in 1960 is given
in Table 12-3. These statistics show that people in younger age
groups constitute a greater proportion, andpeople in older age
groups a smaller proportion, of total city arrestsrelative to the
proportion they constitute of, say, construction workers and in-
dustrial laborers. There exist, however, significant differences in
the age distribution of arrests across specific crime categories. In
particular, total arrests for embezzlement, fraud, forgery, and
counterfeiting include a much smaller proportion of juveniles and
a greater proportion of persons 45 years old and overrelative to
121960, 54 percent of all state prisoners were convicted of index crimes against
property (robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft), 24.7 percent forcrimes
against the person (homicide, assault, and sex offenses), and 10 percent for
embezzlement, fraud, and forgery (see Characteristics of State Prisoners, 1960,
National Prisoner Statistics, 1960, p. 10). In contrast, in 1965, 25 percent
of all federal prisoners were convicted for interstate transportation of motor
vehicles, 8.3 percent for forgery, 17.9 percent for violations of drug laws, and
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index crimes against property.'3 These findings are generally con-
sistent with the proposition, noted earlier, that crimes against
property are typically committed by the relatively young because
they have less investment in legitimate occupations.
Strong empirical support for the proposition that school enroll-
ment and participation in criminal activity are negatively correlated
is provided in Simpson and Van Arsdol's 1967 study of juvenile
referrals to the Los Angeles County probation department. They
found that the delinquency rate among juveniles 14 to 17 years
old who were not enrolled in school was about 2.5 times higher
than the rate for those who were enrolled, but that no large differ-
ence existed in the rate of delinquency for enrollees with educa-
tional attainment above or below the modal educational achieve-
ment. On this basis, they conclude that ".--schoolenrollment
per Se, regardless of relative achievement, presents a deterrent to
delinquency" (Simpson & Van Arsdol, 1967, p. 39).
'31n all arrest statistics, the representation of older age groups is relatively small.
This is due partly to the fact that older and more experienced offenders are
more efficient at self-protection than younger offenders and are thus better




15—19 20—24 25—4445 and over
Construction workers 7.96* 11 .7644.63 32.65
Industrial laborers 7.13*13.2147.00 32.66
Total city arrests 14.05 12.2142.96 24.91
Robbery 30.95 20.3030.30 2.90
Burglary 36.43 15.60 19.50 2.69
Larceny 31.48 11.6322.12 7.83
Auto theft 58.91 12.29 11.62 1.21
Murder and manslaughter 13.60 17.3849.17 18.78
Assault 12.66 16.64 53.31 13.90
Gambling 3.11 10.1453.40 33.13
Embezzlement and fraud 5.02 15.3163.30 15.65
Forgery and counterfeiting 13.33 20.7846.69 18,09
Buying and receiving property 25.43 17.5035.37 10.02
* Forage group 14 to 19.
SOURCES:U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963c,
gation (1961, p. 92).
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Theofficial census publications do not contain direct informa-
tion on the educational attainment of convicted offenders by race.
Census data on schooling attainments of all inmates of institutions
in the United States in 1960 indicate, however, that the median
number of years of school completed by nonwhite males in the
age group 25 to 34 was 8.9, compared with 8.7 for whites (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1963a, Table 22). The respective data for
nonwhite and white females were 9.0 and 8.2. In contrast, the
ranking of the schooling attainments of white and nonwhite males
and females in the experienced civilian labor force was reversed:
12.2 for white males and 12.3 for white females, as against 10.1
for nonwhite males and 11.3 for nonwhite females (U.S. Bureau
of the Census, 1963a, Table 8). Moreover, the rankings of the
schooling attainments of white and nonwhite inmates of older
ages were also reversed from those in the age group 25 to 34 and
conformed to their respective rankings in the civilian labor force.
A possible explanation for these conflicting rankings may have
to do with the varying proportions of different categories of
offenders in different age groups among inmates of closed institu-
tions. Although the overall proportion of prisoners to inmates of
all closed institutions is about one-third (the other two-thirds being
in homes for the aged or for neglected children and in various closed
hospitals), the proportion of prisoners in the age group 25 to 34
should be much greater, since the latter group is the mean and
modal age group of all prisoners. The greater median school attain-
ment of nonwhite inmates in this age group is consistent with the
proposition that discrimination in legitimate occupations might
result in a higher level of educational attainment for nonwhite
offenders.
EVIDENCESincecrime statistics are based on complaints of victims and state-
FROMCRIME
STATISTICSmentsof witnesses to cnme and are collected independently of an
offender's arrest or conviction, they are free of much of the selective
sampling biases inherent in arrest and prison data. However, they
do not provide direct information on offenders' characteristics,
and such information must be inferred indirectly. In work on par-
ticipation in illegitimate activities (Ehrlich, 1970, 1973), informa-
tion on the rate of specific offenses across states in the United States
from three decennial censuses has been used to test the basic prop-
ositions of the model via a cross-state regression analysis employing
ordinary least squares and simultaneous equation estimation tech-Education, income, and human behavior 328
niques.A major advantage of such analysis is that it permits sta-
tistical control of variations across states in measures of average
probability and severity of punishment for specific crimes, unem-
ployment and income characteristics, and various demographic
variables. Thus partial correlations can be estimated between the
rate of specific offenses and each of their explanatory variables.
Part of the empirical analysis was consequently devoted to the
econometric specification and actual testing of proposition 1, pre-
sented earlier.
According to the theoretical analysis, given the probability and
severity of punishment for crime, and assuming that pecuniary
returns from legitimate and illegitimate activities were either pro-
portionately related to or statistically independent of nonpecuniary
returns from these activities, the crime rate in each state is expected
to be a positive function of the mean (pecuniary) differential returns
from crime (W, —W,).Information concerning monetary returns
from specific crimesis presently unavailable on a state-by-state
basis, and so the relevant legitimate earning opportunitiescan-
not be estimaled directly. It is postulated that the average illegal
•payoffs of crimes against property depend primarily on the level
of transferable assets in the community —thatis, on opportuni-
ties provided by potential victims of crime —and,to a much lesser
extent, on the offender's education and legitimate training. The
relative variation in the average potential illegal payoff iZij may
be approximated by the variation in, say, the median value of trans-
ferable assets per family or family income across states 14The
preceding postulate and the previous discussion under Education
and Crime also imply that those in a state with legitimate returns
well below the median have greater differential returns from prop-
erty crimes and hence have more incentive to participate in such
crimes than those in states with incomes well above the median.'5
'4Moreprecisely, the assumption is that given the relative distribution of family
income in a state, variations in average potential payoffs on property crimes
can be approximated by the variation in the level of the entire distribution, if
the income distribution is of the log normal variety, it can be shown that the
variation in its level would be reflected by an equal proportional variation in
its median value. The relative variation in potential payoffs on property crimes
may be an unbiased estimator of the relative variation in actual payoffs if (pri-
vate) self-protection of property by potential victims were proportionally related
to their wealth. See Ehrlich and Becker (1972) for an elaborate discussion of
the relation between the two.
argument appears to be consistent with one made by Adam Smith who
noted that "the affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, whoOn the relation between education and crime329
Thevariation in the mean legitimate opportunities available to
potential offenders across states iiY, may therefore be approximated
by the variation of the mean income level of those below the state's
median. Partly because of statistical considerations, the latter was
computed somewhat indirectly, by the percentage of families below
one-half of the median income in a state, denoted X ("income in-
equality").16 Since X is a measure of the relative distance between
legitimate and illegitimate opportunities available to potential
offenders changes in W, X held constant, would amodnt
to equal percentage changes in the absolute wage differential
—Given the full cost of punishment per offense f,andthe
probability of apprehension and conviction p. an increase in W
might then have a positive effect on the incidence of crimes against
property, similar to the effect of an increase in income inequality X.
In this empirical implementation the extent of punishment is
measured by the length of the effective incarceration period of con-
victed offenders. If punishment for crime were solely by imprison-
ment, an increase in the median income W, X held constant, would
cause an equal proportional increase in the pecuniary "wage dif-
ferential" from crime as well as in the opportunity cost of imprison-
ment to all offenders, and its net effect on crime rates might then
be null if changes in the level of pecuniary income did not affect
the relative preference for legal and illegal activities (see the dis-
cussion above under Education and Crime). In contrast, an increase
in income inequality, W held constant, would imply a decrease in
both legitimate earnings opportunities and the opportunity cost of
are often both driven by want and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions"
(Smith, 1937, p. 670). By our reasoning, since potential gains from crimes
against property are assumed to be largely independent of education and legiti-
mate training, those with legitimate earning opportunities well below the aver-
age would have a greater incentive to commit such crimes regardless of possible
envy or hate they may feel toward the more affluent members of society.
increase in X, with median (and mean) family income held constant, implies
a decrease in the mean income of relatively poor familiesand an increase
in the mean income of the relatively rich iii.. Since the latter have an incentive
to specialize in legitimate market activities, the increase in Wrmayhave very
little negative impact on the total amount of property crimes committed in the
community, but the decrease in iscertainly expected to increase it. This
argument regarding the effect of changes in X on crimes against property does
not apply equally to crimes against the person because there is no a priori rea-
son to assume that the majority of families with income above the median level
do not participate at all in such crimes. The statistical advantage of using X
in lieu ofin the regression analysis is that the correlation ofwith W
is high, whereas the correlation of X with W is much weaker.Education, income, and human behavior 330
imprisonmentto offenders. In practice, however, a major propor-
tion of offenders convicted for property crimes are punished by
means other than imprisonment:'7 Consequently, both income in-
equality and the median income level are expected to be positively
related to the incidence of property crimes in the cross-state re-
gressions:'8
Table 12-4 shows estimates of the partial elasticities of rates of
specific crimes against property to changes in income inequality X
and in the median family income W across states. These elasticities
were derived from the following regression equation:'9
in(_Q)__ai+b111nP1+ b21/nT1+c11lnX+ c21lnW
÷e1lnNW+/.i,(12-5)
where = rate of the ith crime category: the number of offenses
known per state population in year t
I',ratio of number of commitments to state and federal
prisons to number of offenses known to have oc-
curred in the same state ("probability of imprison-
ment") in year t
= average time served in state prisons by offenders
first released in year t
'7According to rough estimates, 53 percent of those convicted of robbery, 77
percent of those convicted of burglary and larceny, and 82 percent of those con-
victed of auto theft are punished by means other than imprisonment in state
and federal prisons; see Ehrlich (1970, Table R-1).
18 thepreceding argument, the estimated regression coefficients associated
with X might still be biased upward, and those associated with W downward,
relative to what their values would have been with the full cost of imprisonment
held constant. Opposite biases on the value of these two coefficients can also
be expected, however, as a result of "spillover effects" unaccounted for in the
cross-state regression analysis; offenders may migrate from one state to another
in response to the different opportunities available in different states. It can
be shown that such spillover effects on the incidence of crime would overstate
the estimated partial effect of Wand understate that of X.
'9Measures of age composition of the population and of unemployment and labor
force participation rates were also introduced into the regression analysis, but
were excluded in the final regressions because the signs of their coefficients
were found to be unstable across most of the specific regressions, and the ratios
of the estimated coefficients to their standard errors were found to be relatively
small. The exclusion of these variables had virtually no effect on the estimates
ofand C2reportedin Table 12-4.On the relation between education and crime331
W= median family income in year t
Xpercentage of families whose income is less than
one-half of W
NW = percentage of nonwhites in thepopulation in year t
= a disturbance term
innatural logarithm
A discussion of the econometric specification of the model, the esti-
mating techniques employed, and the many problems in the con-
struction of specific variables used to measure the pertinent theo-
retical variables, which is avoided here for lack of space, may be
found in Ehrlich (1970, 1973). It shduld be noted, however,that
to obtain efficient estimates of the regressioncoefficients, the re-
gression equation (12-5) was weighted by the square root of the
population in each state, since an analysis of residuals in Un-
weighted regressions indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity,
which was negatively related to population size. (Such heterosce-
dasticity is consistent with the hypothesis that the stochastic vari-
ableis homoscedastic at the individual level.)
Despite the shortcomings of the data and the crude estimates
for some of the desired statistics, the results of the regression anal-
ysis appear to be highly consistent with the proposition that those
with lower schooling levels and training, and hence lower potential
legal income, have a relatively greater tendency to engage in crimes
against property. The rates of robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto
theft are found to vary positivaly with the measures of income
inequality and median family income across states in all specific
regressions and census years investigated. In Table 12-4 the regres-
sion coefficients c11 andwhich are estimates of the elasticities
of withrespect to X and W, are generally greater than unity,
and virtually all exceed twice their standard errors.2° Moreover,
20 coefficientsc21 may reflect, in part, the effect of urbanization on the rate
of specific crimes (by greater accessibility to criminal opportunities in metro-
politan areas) because W is highly correlated with the level of urbanization
across states. This may be one reason why the absolute valuesofin regres-
sions using 1940 and 1950 data are lower than those in the 1960 regressions:
the dependent variables in 1940 and 1950 are "urban crime rates," whereas
those in 1960 are state rates. Also note that X and W in the 1940 regressions
were calculated on the basis of data on wage and salary earningsof workers
rather than family income data (unavailable in 1940), and therefore the esti-
mates of c11 andin that year are not exactly comparable with those of the
























X W X W
Robbery .7222 1.6608 .4798 1.7278
.9294) (4.2214) (.7008) (3.2329)
Burglary 1.6939 .8327 1.8697 1.1891
13/S.E. (2.8321) (.8003) (3.5361) (2.0207)
Larceny 3.7371 .6186 3.3134 1.9784
(6.5307) (2.2095) (6.1904) (4.8461)
Auto theft
$/S.E.
All crimes 2.2598 1.5836
against$/S.E. (4.8419) (4.5210)
property
* OLS=ordinaryleast squares estimates.
f 2SLS =estimatesderived by a two-stage least squares procedure.
SUR =seeminglyunrelated regression estimates derived by applying Aitken's gen-
eralized least squares to the system of all four property crimes following a method
devised by Zeilner (1962).
§ pelasticity estimate; S.E.standard error of
3and 5).
point estimates obtained from several 1960 regressions employing
different estimation techniques are highly consistent. In contrast,
X and W were found to have a lower effect on the incidence of mur-
der, rape, and aggravated assault, and the regression coefficients
(c's) associated with X and W in regressions for these crimes were
generally less than twice their standard errors (see Ehrlich, 1970,
Tables 2 & 6; 1973). The finding that variations in X and W have
a relatively larger and more significant effect on the incidence of
crimes against property than on the incidence of crimes against
the person lends credibility to proposition 1 and to the choice of
these income variables as indicators of relative "earnings" opportu-
nities in property crimes.
In addition to testing proposition 1, I also attempted to test di-
rectly the partial effect of mean educational attainments on the
rate of specific crimes across states. This was done by expanding
the regression model [Eq. (12-5)] to include the percentage of males
in the age group 15 to 25, census estimates of the unemployment
rate for urban males, and the mean number of school years com-
pleted by the population over 25 years of age (hereafter designated
by symbol Ed). Given the economic and demographic characteris-On the relation between education and crime333
1960 1960
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tics of the population, one might expect a negative correlation be-
tween Ed and all specific crimes, assuming that education does
play some role in directing individual motivation and propensities
along socially desirable avenues. The results with respect to the
partial effect of Ed were disappointing, however, for they showed a
positive and significant association between Ed and (particularly)
crimes against property across states in 1960 (see Ehrlich, 1970,
App. R, Tables R-7 & R-14). One possible explanation for these
results is that Ed works as a surrogate for the average permanent
income in the population: Given the distribution of current family
income (approximated by X and W), the average schooling attain-
ments may be an efficient indication of the level of income
and thus of the true level of transferable assets in a state. Since
the latter are expected to be positively correlated with illegitimate
opportunities (as is W), the positive partial regression coefficient
associated with Ed in the regression for property crimes may not,
then, be so surprising. Another possible explanation is that given
X and W, Ed may be negatively related to the level of unreported
crimes, which is particularly high for crimes against property (see
Ehrlich, 1970, pp. 54—55, and Table R-1, p. 132). Since educationEducation, income, and human behavior 334
mayincrease the efficiency of law-enforcement agencies and the
general public in reporting crime, it might, ceteris paribus, be posi-
tively related to all the reported crime rates, particularly to rates
of crime against property.
In contrast to the disappointing results obtained in testing the
partial effect of Ed on specific crime rates, interesting and plausible
results were obtained for the partial effect of education on the ef-
fectiveness of law-enforcement activity across states. In the context
of testing the interaction between crime and law enforcement
through a simultaneous equation model, an attempt was made to
estimate an aggregate production function of law-enforcement
activity: estimates of the probabilities of apprehension and im-
prisonment for crime P were regressed on total expenditures for
police activity and other variables. Given the level of expenditure
on police, the crime level itself, the size and density of the popula-
tion, and income inequality, it was found that the partial effect of
Ed on P was positive and statistically significant; the estimated
elasticity is 2.4 (see Ehrlich, 1973). Since higher educational attain-
ments among the state population would presumably also be re-
flected in higher educational attainments among all law-enforce-
ment agents, this result may be interpreted as evidence for the
role of education of both the potential victims and law-enforcement
agents as an efficiency parameter in the production of law-enforce-
ment activity.
CONCLUSIONTheapproach one takes in analyzing the relation between education
and crime is not independent of the approach one takes in analyzing
the determinants of crime itself. An economic approach to criminal-
ity, as developed here and elsewhere, emphasizes the role that
objective market opportunities play in determining entry into, and
the extent of participation in, illegitimate activities. In this chapter
I have attempted to analyze the relation between education and
crime by concentrating on the role education may have in deter-
mining such opportunities. The analysis suggests that education
does not have a uniform effect on illegitimate and legitimate oppor-
tunities, but has an effect which varies according to the comple-
mentarity of schooling and legitimate training with inputs employed
in producing legitimate and illegitimate returns. I have postulated,
however, that given the probability of punishment and the length
of imprisonment, education would bias relative opportunities away
from crimes against property, which constitute the bulk of all felo-
nies in the United States, and increase the cost of crimes againstOn the relation between education and crime335
the person. This postulate, and other related ones, are found to be
not inconsistent with empirical evidence from arrest and prison
data, as well as from crime statistics.
Perhaps the most important finding reported in this chapter is
the positive and statistically significant association between the
extent of income inequality, measured as the relative density of
the lower tail of the family-income distribution, and the rate of all
specific crimes against property across states in three census
years.2' There also exists some evidence of a positive association
between inequality in earnings and the dispersion in schooling
across regions in the United States (see, for example, Chiswick,
1967), as well as a growing body of empirical evidence confirming
the importance of education and on-the-job training in determining
the distribution of labor and personal income (see Mincer, 1969).
A logical inference from these findings is, then, that the extent
of specific crimes against property is directly related to inequalities
in schooling and on-the-job training. Moreover, it is essentially the
inequalities in the distribution of schooling and training, not their
mean levels, that appear to be strongly related to the incidence
of many crimes. This indicates a social incentive for equalizing
schooling and training opportunities which is independent of ethical
considerations or a specific social welfare function, provided, of
course, that equalizing educational opportunities would also lead
to a greater equality in the distribution of actual educational attain-
ments and legitimate earnings. Answers to the question of whether
it would pay society to spend more resources in order to promote
equality in educational opportunities as a deterrent to crime and
to the question of what the optimal expenditure for that purpose
should be would depend not only on the effect of such expenditure
on the actual distribution of earnings opportunities but also on the
extent to which alternative methods of combating crime "pay."22
A general implication of this analysis concerns rehabilitation
21fl'Js finding is consistent with a similar one by Fleisher (1966), who reported
a positive association between aggregate arrest rates and the difference between
the incomes of the highest and second-to-lowest quartiles,of families, based on
a regression analysis using intercity and intracity data. His analysis and method
of estimation are, however, different from those here, and some of the results
are statistically insignificant.
22 results obtained in my study of the effectiveness of law-enforcement
activity through police and courts indicate that in 1960, for example, law en-
forcement "paid" (indeed, "overpaid") in the sense that the marginal revenue
from apprehending and convicting offenders, measured in terms of the resulting
lower social cost of crime, exceeded the marginal cost of such activity.Education, income, and human behavior336
programs for offenders. If criminal behavior were primarily the
result of a unique motivation of offenders, rehabilitative efforts
would need to emphasize psychological and other related treatment
of convicted offenders. This analysis and the empirical findings
indicate, however, that criminal behavior is to a large extent also
the result of the relative earnings opportunities of offenders in
legitimate and illegitimate activities, and these may shift toward
the latter following apprehension and conviction for crime. This
suggests that rehabilitation efforts intended as an effective deterrent
against recidivism must emphasize specific training of offenders
for legitimate activities (perhaps along with other treatments) prior
to their release from prison. Much more research is needed, how-
ever, in order to confirm the effectiveness of such rehabilitation
efforts and of programs for equalizing schooling and training op-
portunities in deterring participation in specific crimes.
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